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Donna Bass entered basic training for the United States
Army in 1980. While performing required physical training exer-
cises she dislocated her right hip. Having difficulty walking and
standing, Donna was taken to Noble Army Hospital where she was
examined by two military doctors. The doctors diagnosed Donna's
injury as a muscle strain and released her to return to the physical
training program. Complaining of increased pain in her right hip,
difficulty in walking, and a "grating" feeling in her right hip joint,
Donna returned to the hospital. The doctors again told Donna
that her injury was only a muscle strain and that they believed she
was concocting a story to avoid basic training exercises. Forced to
continue basic training exercises, her requests to consult a private
doctor denied, soon Donna could no longer walk. The doctors fi-
nally performed diagnostic tests and discovered a dislocated hip.
Permanently disabled, Donna was medically discharged from the
Army. Despite the negligent actions of the Army doctors, Donna
cannot sue either the government or the doctors in their individual
capacity.'
In July 1945, Arthur Jefferson, an Army enlistee, had a gall
bladder operation 2 at the Army hospital in Indiantown Gap, Penn-
sylvania. Suffering from vomiting spells and nausea, Arthur un-
derwent a second operation in a private hospital eight months
later. Surgeons found a 1 1/2 by 2 1/2 foot towel bearing the leg-
end "Medical Department U.S. Army" in Arthur's abdominal cav-
ity. As a post-operative result of the towel's removal, Arthur
sustained a serious hernia, requiring him to wear a corset. He
could not lean forward either standing or sitting in a chair, and
* Mary Beth Heinen will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota
Law School in 1989.
1. Bass v. Parsons, 577 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Va. 1984). Since the government's
motion to dismiss was at issue, all the facts in the complaint were accepted as true.
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court at 4,
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 50-9).
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had to lie down after three or four hours of any activity. Arthur
was no longer employable industrially, and at less than 50 years of
age it was doubtful that he could ever engage in any gainful em-
ployment. Nevertheless, Arthur lacked recourse against the gov-
ernment or the surgeon.3
Henry Winston contracted a brain tumor in April 1959. Wor-
ried about Henry's "dizziness, instability, and difficulty with his vi-
sion," Henry's attorney scheduled an examination with prison
doctors. The diagnosis was "borderline hypertension" and the doc-
tors recommended weight loss as a solution. Experiencing an in-
creasing number of attacks, severe headaches, periodic loss of
vision and an inability to walk, Henry again complained to prison
authorities. He was given Dramamine 4 without further examina-
tion. Henry's attorney visited him in January 1960. Alarmed by
Henry's condition, the attorney scheduled an examination by a
consulting physician. The following month, an operation in New
York City revealed a benign tumor of the cerebellum. Henry is
permanently blind due to the delay in treatment. Henry is a fed-
eral prisoner and may sue both the federal government and the
doctors responsible for his condition.5
In each of these cases, the individual's status accounts for the
disparity of treatment. The plaintiffs in the first two actions were
military personnel while the plaintiff in the third case was a fed-
eral prisoner. Military personnel have no judicial remedy for inju-
ries or death deemed "incident to the service." 6 This denial of
remedy is due to a court created principle known as the Feres doc-
trine. Yet the remainder of the United States population, includ-
ing federal prisoners and aliens,7 may sue the government or its
3. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949). This case was one of
three decided by the Supreme Court in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4. Dramamine is usually taken for motion sickness. Physicians' Desk Refer-
ence For Nonprescription Drugs 1868 (1987).
5. Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd sub nom United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). In Muniz, the Supreme Court decided two
separate suits in a single case. The first involved Henry Winston as a plaintiff. The
second involved Carlos Muniz, a federal prisoner who was struck by a fellow in-
mate while outside a prison dormitory. Twelve inmates chased Muniz into another
dormitory. One of the guards, instead of calling for help or assisting Muniz, locked
the dormitory door. Muniz was thus trapped in the midst of his tormentors. The
prisoners attacked Muniz, beating him with chairs, sticks, and other objects until he
lost consciousness.
Muniz was hospitalized and underwent a series of operations. As a result of the
beating, Muniz suffered a fractured skull and the loss of vision in his right eye.
The Court held that Muniz was entitled to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). 374 U.S. at 152.
6. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
7. See, e.g., Robert Johnson, The Federal Tort Claims Act - A Substantive
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agents for injuries or death resulting from negligence.8 Military
personnel 9 are thus singled out and afforded fewer rights than
other members of society.
This inequity results from the Feres doctrine's application
and expansion by the judiciary.' 0 While Feres v. United States"
did not address the propriety of suit against individual military
tortfeasors, judicial interpretation of the doctrine blocks this road
to recovery as well.1 2 The Supreme Court held that the Feres ra-
tionale prevents suits between servicepersons for constitutional
torts. Race discrimination within the military is thus not subject
to judicial redress.1s The Feres doctrine encompasses intentional
torts.14 Soldiers dying of cancer from the intentional exposure to
radiation by their superiors are thereby barred from suit. Finally,
this judicially created exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)'5 extends to family members of military personnel if the
family member's injury is traceable to a service-connected injury.'6
Survey, 6 U. Rich. L. Rev. 65, 70 (1971). ("[R]ecovery has been permitted under the
FTCA to aliens, infants, corporations, Indians, and veterans.").
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976).
9. In 1986, the number of military personnel totaled 2.15 million. 1987 Defense
Dept. Ann. Rep. 44 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 347 (D.D.C. 1979)
("[W]here plaintiffs have sought recovery for injuries sustained in the course of
military service, lower courts have consistently construed the Feres doctrine of im-
munity broadly.")
11. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
12. See, e.g., Howard Donaldson, Constitutional Torts and Military Effective-
ness: A Proposed Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F.L. Rev. 171, 172 (1982-
83); Robert Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. Rev.
24, 40 (1976).
13. See, e.g. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The plaintiffs alleged that
their superior officers discriminated against them because of race in violation of
their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs cited unfair duty assignments, unfair per-
formance evaluations, and excessive penalties as examples of discriminatory behav-
ior. Id. at 297.
14. Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 663 F.2d
1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). In Jaffee, Stanley Jaffee
claimed his constitutional rights were violated when Army and civilian Defense De-
partment employees compelled him and other soldiers to participate in radiation
testing of a nuclear device. As a result of this exposure to radiation, Jaffee suffers
from inoperable lymphatic cancer. Id. at 1248. Jaffee was denied recovery under
the FTCA.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982). As a result of
the negligent medical treatment his mother received during basic training for the
Air Force, Charles Lewis Scales was born with congenital rubella syndrome. The
infant suffered from a heart murmur, cataracts, growth deficiency, and respiratory
problems as a result of the condition. Futhermore, neurological damage and
mental and physical retardation were possible. The court denied recovery notwith-
standing that the infant had an independent cause of action under state law. The
court held that the military discipline policy underlying Feres barred recovery even
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An oral argument before Judge Stern of the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia in Thornwell v. United States 17
illustrates the impact of judicial expansion of the Feres doctrine:
The Court: [A]s I read the law it doesn't matter if they stood
up there and, 'one, two, three, left, right, left,' and marched
them over a cliff. You'd be protected under Feres ...
The Govt: Yes, your Honor. 18
The striking inequities apparent in our legal system's treat-
ment of military personnel through the application of the Feres
doctrine is the subject of this article. Part I examines and criti-
cizes the doctrine and its underlying rationale. Part II analyzes a
recent Congressional response to the doctrine's shortcomings.19
Finally, Part III presents a proposal for reform of the current
treatment of injured military personnel.
I. Background
The evolution of the Feres doctrine has not been smooth.
Courts have continually struggled to define "incident to service,"
the phrase that triggers government nonliability. The cause of dif-
ficulty is the fact that neither the original rationale for Feres nor
its numerous transformations support this judicially created excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1946 Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act,20 lift-
ing the historical blanket of sovereign immunity from the federal
government.21 The FTCA governs the negligence of federal enti-
ties, and was designed to "extend a remedy to those who had been
though there was no command relationship between the infant and the individual
tortfeasor. Id.
The Feres doctrine does not apply to bar suit by military dependents or other
individuals if their injuries are not traceable to a service-connected injury. The
courts, however, generously construe what is traceable to a service-related injury
and thereby preserve the scope of the Feres doctrine.
17. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). For further discussion of the facts of this
case, see infra notes 98 and 147.
18. Id. at 348 n.1 (quoting Jaffee, 468 F. Supp. at 635).
19. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1054 by a vote of 312-61 on Feb-
ruary 17, 1988. 134 Cong. Rec. S929-02 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1988). It was received in
the Senate the next day. At the time this article went to press, H.R. 1054 was pend-
ing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practices.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976).
21. For a thorough discussion of the history of the sovereign immunity doctrine
and its relationship to the Barr rule of immunity for lower government officials,
see Michael Graham, Malpractice Protection for Military Medical Personnel and
the Feres Doctrine: Constitutional Tension for the Military Plaintiff?., 12 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 525, 526-31 (1978).
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without."22 The FTCA mandates that "[tihe United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims,
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances .... ,23 Subject to thirteen exceptions, 24
the FTCA allows any negligence claim against the federal govern-
ment for money damages. The applicable law is that of the place
where the tort occurred.25
B. An Early Decision Interpreting the FTCA: Brooks v.
United States
Three years after the FTCA went into effect, the Supreme
Court addressed the rights of military personnel under the FTCA
for injuries not "incident to service." 26  In Brooks v. United
22. Feres, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
24. The list of exceptions in full is as follows: (a) Any claim based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execu-
tion of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. (b) Any claim aris-
ing out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal mat-
ter. (c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of cus-
toms or excise or any other law-enforcement officer. (d) Any claim for which a
remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title 46 relating to claims or suits
in admiralty against the United States. (e) Any claim arising out of an act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections
1-31 of Title 50, Appendix. (f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or
establishment of quarantine by the United States. (g) [Repealed) (h) Any claim
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after
the date of the enactment of this provision, out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of
this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the
United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violation of Federal law. (i) Any claim for damages caused by the
fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system. (j)
Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war. (k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority. (m)
Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company. (n) Any
claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate
credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives. Id. at § 2680. For a more complete discus-
sion of the exceptions pertinent to military members, see infra text accompanying
notes 154-60.
25. Id. at § 1346(b).
26. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). In Brooks the Court first
held that whether injuries of servicepersons caused by another serviceperson's neg-
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States,27 two enlistees were on leave from the United States Army.
Their car was struck by a truck negligently driven by a civilian
employee of the Army. One of the men was killed instantly and
the other was seriously injured as a result of the accident.28
The government moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiffs were members of the military at the
time of the accident and were thus barred from recovery. 29 Em-
phasizing that terms of the FTCA were "clear," the Supreme
Court concluded that the language, framework, and legislative his-
tory of the FTCA dictated recovery by the plaintiffs3 0
The Court reasoned that the FTCA's language specifically al-
lowed recovery for "any claim." 31 Moreover, the FTCA disallowed
recovery for claims arising in a foreign country and claims arising
out of combatant activities of the military during time of war.32
The disallowance of these two specific military claims demon-
strated that Congress intended recovery for other military claims.
The Court stressed that the provision allowing recovery for "any
claim" was unambiguous, and none of the specifically delineated
exceptions barred recovery.33
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined the legislative
history of the FTCA. Although eighteen tort claims bills were
brought before Congress between 1925 and 1935, only two denied
recovery to military personnel. 34 The Court quickly rejected an
argument against recovery based on the injured claimant having
received veterans benefits.3 5 Statutes providing disability pay-
ments to servicepersons and gratuitous payments to their survivors
did not prohibit recovery under the FTCA.36 While typical work-
ligence were "incident to service" or "not incident to service" dictated recovery. Id.
at 49 (emphasis added). The Brooks court specifically did not decide whether judi-
cial recovery was allowed for the "wholly different case" of injuries incurred inci-
dent to service. Id. at 52.
27. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
28. Id. at 50.
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k),(j)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Brooks court implied that government benefits received would be sub-
tracted from any recovery under the FTCA, finding "no indication that Congress
meant the United States to pay twice for the same injury." Id. at 53. Upon remand
the Fourth Circuit reduced the FTCA judgment by the amount of disability bene-
fits the plaintiff had received or would receive in the future. United States v.
Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1949).
36. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53.
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ers compensation statutes provided for exclusivity of remedy,3 7
such a provision was absent in both the FTCA and the veterans
laws. The Court concluded that the specific provisions in other
statutes and the language of the FTCA itself made it highly un-
likely that the absence of an exclusivity provision for military
members was a result of Congressional oversight. Therefore, mili-
tary members injured in circumstances not incident to their ser-
vice were afforded redress by the FTCA. Although Brooks has
never been overruled, later court decisions have narrowed its ap-
plication by generously construing the term "incident to service." 38
C. A Judicially Created Exception to the FTCA for
Military Plaintiffs: Feres v. United States
One year after the Brooks case was decided, the Supreme
Court faced the issue reserved in Brooks: whether the United
States government was liable under the FTCA for injuries "inci-
dent to service" sustained by servicepersons resulting from the
negligence of other servicepersons. The Court was determining if
an individual's status as an active duty enlisted person barred re-
dress for an otherwise actionable wrong.39
In Feres v. United States,40 a lieutenant died in a barracks
fire. The executrix of his estate instituted a negligence suit based
on the military's having quartered him in barracks known to be
unsafe. A defective heating plant existed in the barracks and con-
sequently caused the fire. The Army also failed to maintain an ad-
equate fire watch. 41
The Brooks court explicitly left open the issue later
presented to the Feres court. While Brooks interpreted the FTCA
to cover claims not incident to service, much of the reasoning in
Brooks "is as apt to impose liability in favor of a man on duty as in
favor of one on leave." 42 A unanimous court in Feres, worried
37. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.031 (West 1966) ("The liability of an em-
ployer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability
to such employe, his personal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child,
dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages on account of
such injury or death.").
38. See infra note 72.
39. The defendant's military status is not dispositive, as civilians may sue the
military under the FTCA. Courtney Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and In-
tramilitary Torts, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 102 (1985).
40. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Along with Feres, the Court considered two cases in-
volving medical malpractice of Army doctors. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d
518 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1950) (army sur-
geons negligently caused death of an army officer).
41. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
42. Id. at 139.
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about depleting the public treasury,43 chose instead to distinguish
Brooks and deny recovery for the service-connected injuries of ac-
tive duty servicepersons.
Noting that the FTCA must fit as much as possible into the
entire statutory system of remedies against the government,44 the
Court cited three45 reasons for its newly created exception to the
FTCA. First, the relationship between the government and mili-
tary personnel was "distinctively federal in character." 46 Since the
federal government and not the soldier chose his location, it would
be unfair to allow the location of a soldier's injury to determine re-
covery. Second, the Veterans Benefits Act (VBA)47 established a
system of "simple, certain, and uniform"48 redress for the injuries
or death of servicepersons. The Court reasoned that the existence
of at least one statutory scheme, albeit a limited one, was sufficient
relief. Third, the FTCA only rendered the government liable "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances," 49 and there was no parallel private lia-
bility when the relationship of the wronged to the wrongdoer was
considered. In other words, because private persons lacked the au-
thority to command armies, private liability in this situation could
never arise.
The Court's reasons were unpersuasive in 1950 and are less
persuasive now.5o Every reason posited by Feres is subject to chal-
lenge.51 With respect to the problem of the injury's geography dic-
tating recovery, soldiers would likely prefer to chance state law
than be denied recovery at the outset. It is less equitable to deny
all soldiers recovery, under the guise of government benevolence,
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Courts and commentators vary in their tabulation of the number of reasons
given by the Supreme Court in support of Feres. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (two reasons); Note, From Feres to Stencel:
Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099
(1979) (four reasons); Sidney Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 Hastings L. J. 1281
(1973) (five reasons).
46. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301, 305 (1947)).
47. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310-62 (1982) (compensation); id. at § 610 (eligibility for hospi-
tal, nursing home and domiciliary care); id. at § 612 (eligibility for medical
treatment).
48. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
49. Id. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
51. See, e.g., Camassar v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 894, 897 (D. Conn. 1975)
(quoting Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.) (precise rationale
for Feres rule and continuing validity have been source of confusion), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 819 (1973)).-
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than to permit recovery if the tort laws of a given state are
favorable.
Furthermore, many other government agencies, such as the
Bureau of the Census and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, perform a "unique, nationwide function," 52 with personnel
and equipment scattered across the country.53 The government is
liable for negligent acts of these agencies despite the fact that re-
sulting suits are governed by laws of the various states.54 Addi-
tionally, when off-duty soldiers are permitted to recover under
Brooks, and the service-connected injuries of discharged soldiers
are aggravated by the negligence of other soldiers,55 government
liability is dictated by the law of the place of injury. It thus re-
mains unexplained why it "makes no sense" 56 for state law to gov-
ern recovery for service-connected injuries of servicepersons, when
the application of state law in similar situations is commonplace.
The Court's second reason for denying recovery-that the
existence of the VBA obviates the need for tort recovery-is also
unconvincing.57 In stark contrast to the Court's logic one year ear-
lier in Brooks, the existence of veterans benefits in Feres was sud-
denly held to preclude FTCA recovery. Yet the reasons given in
Brooks for not allowing veterans benefits to bar an FTCA recovery
remain convincing.
Veterans benefits are an inadequate replacement for tort re-
52. Stencel, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where the
court candidly stated:
[T]he notion that the soldier-sovereign relationship is distinctly federal
in character evades easy application. The Supreme Court has never
made clear why this relationship makes impossible the determination
of an analogous private liability, given that such a determination has
been made in cases involving other relationships that are seemingly
just as 'distinctly federal in character.' See, e.g., United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (relationship
between federal prison officials and prisoners); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (relation-
ship between Coast Guard and vessels it protects).
Hunt, 636 F.2d at 597.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
56. Feres, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950).
57. In Hunt the court stated:
The second factor discussed in Feres, the presence of an alternative
military compensation system, is no less nebulous than the first. The
Supreme Court has relied on this factor in cases in which it has ap-
plied the Feres doctrine, but it has also rejected the factor's impor-
tance in other cases in which its use would seem equally appropriate.
636 F.2d at 598 (citations omitted).
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covery for two reasons.5 8 First, veterans benefits are meager when
compared to tort recovery.5 9 Second, an injured soldier is not
guaranteed veterans benefits; rather, their availability depends on
the serviceperson's discharge status.60 For example, a military
member discharged for "homosexual acts,"61 conscientious objec-
tion 62 or any "offense involving moral turpitude" 63 will be denied
benefits. 64 Even if a serviceperson's death or injury is sufficiently
58. Howland, supra note 39, at 135. For a more extensive comparison of tort
recovery to veterans benefits, see id. at 133-37.
59. See id. at 136 ("Veterans benefits pale in comparison to potential tort recov-
eries."). See also Graham, supra note 21, at 553 (determination of veterans benefits
disregards standard of pain and suffering); Douglas Bradshaw, Veterans Adminis-
tration Benefits and Tort Claims Against the Military, Army Law., Sept. 1986, at 6.
Bradshaw explains:
The primary periodic monetary benefits payable to veterans, their
dependents, or survivors for disability or death are compensation and
pension.... Payments are based upon the degree of severity of disa-
bility. The amount of compensation ranges from $68 per month for a
10% disability to $1,335 per month when the veteran is 100% dis-
abled....
Death compensation, known as Disability and Indemnity Compen-
sation (DIC), is paid to eligible survivors (spouse, children, dependent
parents) of a veteran who dies of a service-connected disability or
while on active duty.... The monthly amount of DIC paid to a surviv-
ing spouse is based upon the veteran's highest military grade while in
service. Current rates range from $491 for the spouse of an E-1, to
$1,345 payable to the spouse of a veteran who served as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army or Air Force,
Chief of Naval Operations, or Commandant of the Marine Corps or
Coast Guard.
Id. at 6-7.
60. Howland, supra note 39, at 136.
61. 38 C.FR. § 3.12(d)(5) (1978).
62. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(1) (1978). The constitutionality of this provision was re-
inforced in Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Watkins v. United States
Army, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished homosexual acts
from homosexual tendencies. 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988). The court then held
that persons of homosexual tendencies were a suspect class and that the army regu-
lations at issue in that case were not necessary to promote a legitimate compelling
governmental interest and were thus unconstitutional. Id. at 1451. Even under the
liberal Watkins decision, however, this statutory provision is constitutional, as it fo-
cuses on homosexual acts rather than protected homosexual tendencies.
63. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(3) (1978).
64. Note, supra note 45, at 1107-08. The regulations in full regarding the types
of discharge that bar payment of veterans benefits are as follows:
(c) Benefits are not payable where the veteran was discharged or re-
leased under one of the following conditions:
(1) As a conscientious objector who refused to perform military
duty, wear the uniform, or comply with lawful order of competent mil-
itary authorities.
(2) By reason of the sentence of a general court-martial.
(3) Resignation by an officer for the good of the service.
(4) As a deserter.
(5) As an alien during a period of hostilities, where it is affirma-
tively shown that the veteran requested his or her release.
(d) A discharge of release because of one of the offenses specified in
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service-connected for Feres purposes, it may not meet VBA re-
quirements, thereby leaving the soldier with no redress.65 As
stated in Hunt v. United States,66 "it cannot be said that the pres-
ence of an alternative compensation system either explains or jus-
tifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of the doctrine
more palatable."67
The third rationale for Feres was that the required parallel
private liability was absent when the relationship of the parties
was considered. This rationale was based on an unduly strict inter-
pretation of the FICA's language requiring parallel private liabil-
ity.6 8 Indeed, a "plain meaning" of the statute indicates that it was
intended to create liability as far-reaching as that of private indi-
viduals. It is illogical to focus on the relationship of the parties,
because the purpose of the FTCA was to reject sovereign immu-
nity where the governmental relationship previously barred
recovery.69
this paragraph is considered to have been issued under dishonorable
conditions.
(1) Acceptance of an undesirable discharge to escape trial by
general court-martial.
(2) Mutiny or spying.
(3) An offense involving moral turpitude. This includes, gener-
ally, conviction of a felony.
(4) Willful and persistent misconduct. This includes a discharge
under other than honorable conditions, if it is determined that it was
issued because of willful and persistent misconduct. A discharge be-
cause of a minor offense will not, however, be considered willful and
persistent misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful and
meritorious.
(5) Generally, homosexual acts.
Id. at 1108 n. 57 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c), (d) (1978)).
65. See, e.g., Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y. 1961); Glorioso
v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (military plaintiffs denied cause of
action under FTCA for their service-connected injuries, even though ineligible for
veterans benefits.).
66. 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 598. For a dispassionate pronouncement of the same principle, see
Bailey v. Von Buskird, 345 F.2d 298, 298 (9th Cir. 1965) ("All we deny plaintiff-ap-
pellant is a remedy he likes better.").
68. Professor David E. Seidelson offers the following analogy:
No one would contend that a motorist injured when his vehicle is
struck by a negligently operated mail delivery truck could not recover
under the FTCA. The Act's applicability is apparent and remains so
even if the truck were carrying first-class mail, an activity prohibited
to any private entity.
David Seidelson, The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight
Into an Old Problem, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 629, 633 (1983).
69. The Court's rationale was explicitly rejected seven years later in Rayonier
Inc. v. United States: "[Tihe very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the
Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to es-
tablish novel and unprecedented governmental liability." 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).
See also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1962) (government liability no
Law and Inequality
Despite its technical language concerns, the Court ignored
the conspicuous absence of a blanket prohibition on claims of mili-
tary personnel, instead "rush[ing] in where legislators feared to
tread."70 Thus, the reasoning of Feres is not persuasive, as the
Court implicitly recognized four years later in United States v.
Brown.71
D. The Modern Justification for the Feres Doctrine:
United States v. Brown and its Progeny
In Brown, the Supreme Court once again grappled with the
definition of "incident to service.''72 The Brown plaintiff, a dis-
charged veteran,73 sought treatment of a service-connected disabil-
ity at a Veterans Administration Hospital. The plaintiff alleged
that the negligently-performed operation resulted in permanent
nerve damage to his leg.74 The majority held the action maintain-
longer restricted to circumstances in which government bodies have traditionally
been responsible for misconduct of their employees, but rather extends to novel
and unprecedented forms of liability as well).
70. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
72. The issue of whether an injury is "incident to service"-dispositive of
whether Brooks or Feres applies--continues to trouble the courts. It is clear that a
military member on active duty (i.e., not on leave) is barred from recovery under
the Feres doctrine. Less clear, however, is whether an injury incurred while on
leave is incident to service. In Camassar v. United States, the court stated that
"[t]he decided cases seem to indicate that if the injury occurred on a base, the claim
is barred, whereas an injury off the base might or might not be barred depending
on what the claimant was doing." 400 F. Supp. at 895. Compare United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (administratrix not entitled to recovery where army's
negligent personnel decision resulted in her enlisted son being kidnapped and mur-
dered by another serviceman while off duty and away from base) and Buer v.
United States, 241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956) (soldier injured while on leave but treated
in military hospital denied recovery under Feres for part of surgical drill left in his
eye), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957) and James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381
(1973) (recovery denied to estate of serviceman where, while on leave but in the
custody of military security personnel at a military installation, racial slurs 'esulted
in fatal beating of enlistee by security guard) and Redmond v. United States, 331 F.
Supp. 1222, 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (service member's death "inseparably intertwined"
with army service, even though failure to diagnose occurred before induction and
death from cancer occurred after discharge) with Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th
Cir. 1974) (recovery allowed for death of naval petty officer on furlough who was
killed in traffic accident caused in part by Navy's negligent road maintenance
where highway was publicly used base access road and officer was returning from
civilian "moonlighting" job).
73. The United States has 27.7 million veterans. Veterans Administration, Fed-
eral Benefits for Veterans and Dependents at i (1987).
74. Peter Brown was honorably discharged from the Armed Services in 1944
following a knee injury incurred while on active duty. In 1950, the Veterans Ad-
ministration operated on the knee. The knee continued to dislocate frequently, and
another operation was performed in 1951. Brown, 348 U.S. at 110.
During the 1951 operation, Army doctors applied a tourniquet to Brown's left
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able against the United States even though the plaintiff's veterans
benefits had been increased due to the aggravated injury.75
The Court's decision necessitated modifying the Feres ration-
ale.76 This time there was no mention of the problems and unfair-
ness in allowing recovery to depend on the fortuity of the injury's
location.77 Moreover, the Brown plaintiff not only received veter-
ans benefits for the initial knee injury but also obtained an in-
crease in benefits following the aggravating operation. The Court
therefore had to abandon issues of the unfairness of disparate state
recovery and the existence of alternative compensation as motivat-
ing factors behind the Feres doctrine.
The Brown Court modified the reasoning behind Feres even
further. Rather than considering the relationship of the parties in
determining whether parallel private liability existed, the Court
now required only parallelism in the substance of the claim. Not-
ing that a medical malpractice claim was cognizable under state
law if the defendant were a private party, the Court held the in-
jury not incident to service and thus allowed recovery under the
FTCA.78 Consequently, the final rationale of Feres was
abandoned.
Perhaps realizing that it had demolished the foundation of
Feres, the Brown court formulated a new one: military disci-
pline.7 9 The Court stated:
leg in a grossly negligent manner. Instead of promptly removing the tourniquet,
the doctors increased its pressure. Brown consequently was hospitalized for 16
weeks and had to return to the hospital daily for treatment following his release.
Brown has no feeling in his leg below the knee, has lost control of some of the mus-
cles in his lower leg, and requires the aid of an orthopedic brace to walk. Tran-
script of Record at 2, United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (No. 54-38).
75. Brown's monthly veterans benefits increased from $15.00 to $119.70. Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit at 4, Brown (No. 54-38).
76. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 12, at 183 (footnote omitted) ("United States
v. Brown narrowed considerably the focus of the overall rationale underlying
Feres.").
77. Feres held that it made "no sense" to let the geography of an injury dictate
government liability in light of the "distinctively federal" relationship between the
government and military personnel. Brown made no mention of this logic, perhaps
predicting its demise. See supra notes 52 through 56 and accompanying text.
78. The Brown Court did not point out that two of the three cases decided in
Feres concerned medical malpractice claims. See supra note 40. Instead of focusing
on the relationship of the parties, the Brown Court found parallel private liability
in the cognizance of medical malpractice suits under local law.
79. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (most sig-
nificant aspect of Brown is what has come to be regarded as single most important
and defensible rationale for the Feres doctrine-military discipline); Stencel Aero
Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (United States v. Brown expli-
cated the military discipline factor considered in Feres).
Law and Inequality
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on disci-
pline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led
the [Feres] Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that
character.8 0
The plaintiff in Brown was not subject to military discipline when
the injury occurred and hence was allowed recovery under the
FTCA.81 Thus, the modern justification for the Feres doctrine was
born.8 2
Subsequent cases fine-tuned the "military discipline" ration-
ale. In Chappell v. Wallace,83 the Court found that "[t]he ines-
capable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders
cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compli-
ance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex
with no time for debate or reflection."8 4 In Hunt, the Court ar-
ticulated that it was "unseemly to have military personnel injured
incident to their service, asserting claims that question the propri-
ety of decisions or conduct by fellow members of the military."8 5
It appears that the Court in Hunt found it more appropriate to sin-
gle out military members and deny them access to the courts.
Both Hunt and Chappell defend the military discipline rationale
based on the allegedly detrimental effect it would have on a sol-
dier's decision whether to obey orders during battle.
With the advent of modern warfare and professionally
trained combat teams, however, blind adherence to rules and or-
ders is no longer the ideal.86 Rather, the ability to modify plans in
the face of changed conditions marks the model soldier.8 7 The
80. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. Note that while Brown cites Feres as authority for
this military discipline rationale, it is nowhere to be found in Feres.
81. 348 U.S. 110. The Brown court did not, however, address the fact that a suit
by Brown would still involve the questioning of military conduct, even if Brown
himself was no longer subject to military command.
82. See, e.g., Hunt, 636 F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (protection of military dis-
cipline serves largely if not exclusively as predicate for Feres doctrine).
83. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
84. Id. at 300.
85. 636 F.2d at 599.
86. Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Jaffee v. United States, called this purported
need for rigid adherence to orders the "serviceman as automaton principle." 663
F.2d 1226, 1250 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982). Unconvinced by the majority's reasons for denying recovery, Judge Gibbons
stated: "The real but unarticulated reason for the result is that the availability of a
private remedy for intentional torts will encourage public accountability of the mil-
itary, while foreclosing such a remedy will encourage concealment (the coverup
principle)." Id. at 1250.
87. Morris Janowitz asserts that during World War II emphasis shifted to the
[Vol. 6:153
1988] FORGOTTEN RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 167
"obey without question" military dicipline rationale of Feres does
not foster innovation. The soldier cannot be expected to be crea-
tive for the first time in battle.
The judicial confusion over the Feres doctrine is further re-
flected in the transient rationales for Feres. The varying logic sug-
gests a lack of substance. Similarly, the military discipline
rationale exhibits a lack of substance. Allowing government liabil-
ity in similar situations has not brought about the dire conse-
quences predicted by the courts. For example, servicepersons can
bring actions on behalf of dependents if the injury does not stem
from the service-connected injury of a serviceperson. Thus, the
parent soldier is allowed to question the reasonableness of another
soldier's actions. Yet military discipline has not suffered from the
judicial examination of the actions or inactions of military
tortfeasors.
Similarly, prison structures have not collapsed with the ad-
vent of government liability for negligence, as the government ar-
gued in United States v. Muniz.88 The Court's dismissal of the
government's "prison discipline fears"8 9 can be seen as further ero-
sion of the modern military discipline logic behind Feres.9°
The Brown minority considered Feres controlling. Their
characterization of the preference for veterans over active duty
members as "an unjustifiable discrimination which the Act does
not require" 9' unwittingly sheds light on the Feres doctrine as a
whole. Surely the preference for all others in the United States
over military members is also "unjustifiable discrimination," espe-
cially in light of Feres' questionable rationale.
E. An Expansion to Bar Third Party Indemnity Claims:
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States
Despite the inroads on the theoretical predicates of the Feres
doctrine, its scope was broadened in Stencel Aero Engineering
individual's "own judgment about the best response to make when confronted with
given types of danger. The very designation 'combat team'... emphasizes the posi-
tive contribution of each person regardless of rank.... The morale and coordina-
tion of a complex group of specialists cannot rest simply on authoritarian
discipline." Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment 43 (1965),
quoted in Howland, supra note 39, at 113.
88. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
89. Id. at 163. The Muniz court concluded that while it was possible that liti-
gating prisoner claims would damage prison discipline, the spectre raised by the
Government was more a matter of possibilities than of actualities. Id.
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States 749 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985) (con-
tinued viability of Feres doctrine again questioned, albeit implicitly, in Muniz).
91. Brown, 348 U.S. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting).
Law and Inequality
Corp. v. United States.9 2 The Stencel court held that the right of a
third party to recover in an indemnity action against the United
States is limited by Feres if the injured party is a serviceperson. 93
Thus, if the plaintiff's injury is service-connected, the original de-
fendant must pay the entire judgment, even if the United States
was primarily responsible for the injury. To achieve this result,
the Court relied on the original Feres rationale.94 As a conse-
quence, the Court ignored the intervening Brown decision which
had stripped the logic of Feres.
The entire Court, however, was not convinced. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justice Brennan, delivered a powerful dissent, il-
lustrating the technical maze in which the Court had trapped
itself. Justice Marshall noted that if the same defective pilot eject
system that caused the serviceman's injuries in Stencel had caused
a crash which injured a civilian, there would be the same "second
guessing of military orders" as in the case at bar.95
The implications of Justice Marshall's analogy are far-reach-
ing. After Brown, the only remaining rationale for the continued
discrimination against servicepersons was the maintenance of mili-
tary discipline. While Feres prohibits the internal questioning of
military orders on the theory that the rigors of military discipline
require it, outsiders are routinely allowed to drag military
tortfeasors into court and question them about their motive, train-
ing, and chain of command if the plaintiff is a private citizen. Be-
cause accountability to outsiders is more intrusive than internal
92. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). See, e.g., Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344,
347 (D.D.C. 1979) ("In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to reconsider Feres, and it again elected a broad
application of the decision.") (citation omitted).
93. 431 U.S. at 673.
94. The Stencel court enumerated three reasons for its decision. First, as in
Feres, it made no sense to have the location of the negligent act determine govern-
ment liability for injuries incurred incident to service. Id. at 672. While the Feres
court held this contingency unfair to the serviceperson, Stencel focused on the un-
fairness of the place of injury controlling the government's liability.
Second, the Veterans Benefits Act served as a cap on government liability for
service-connected injuries. Permitting federal indemnity of government contrac-
tors would circumvent this cap. Id. at 673. The Stencel Court convoluted this ra-
tionale as well. In Feres veterans benefits were hailed as "no-fault" and "simple,
certain, and uniform" recovery for the soldier, whereas Stencel recharacterized
them as an "upper limit of liability" for the government.
Finally, even if brought by a third party, cases of this type would still adversely
affect military discipline and involve the second-guessing of military orders. The
Court reached this result by reasoning that the question litigated would be the de-
gree of fault of servicepersons. Military personnel would still be required to testify
about each other's decisions and actions. Such testimony would therefore impinge
on military discipline. Id.
95. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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accountability, 96 Justice Marshall's dissent weakens the foundation
of Feres' last supporting rationale.
In short, for 38 years the Feres doctrine has barred claims by
on-duty servicepersons injured due to the negligence of other ser-
vicepersons. Indeed, the scope of the Feres doctrine has been ex-
panded to apply to virtually all facets of active duty, including
recreation, off-duty secondary employment on a military base, and
the activities of reservists. 97 Thus, it is not likely that any relief
will come from the judiciary. 98
The judiciary has commented that it is Congress' prerogative
to change the law. The Supreme Court reflected on this in Feres,
when it stated "if we misinterpret the Act, at least Congress pos-
sesses a ready remedy."99
II. Congressional Action
Congress is currently considering a bill that would allow
soldiers to sue for service-connected medical or dental malpractice.
Although the Justice and Defense Departments strongly object to
96. See Howland, supra note 39, at 105 ("To the [Supreme] Court, separateness
[is required by the military and] connotes the isolation of the military and its per-
sonnel from civilians and civilian institutions.").
97. Hearings on H.R. 1054 and H.R. 1341 Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Richard K. Willard,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
98. Not all judges, however, have glibly applied Feres. Judge Gibbons delivered
a chillingly eloquent dissent in Jaffee:
That any judicial tribunal in the world, in the last fifth of this dismal
century, would choose to place a class of persons outside the protection
against human rights violations provided by the admonitory law of in-
tentional torts is surprising. That it should be an American court will
dismay persons the world over concerned with human rights and will
embarrass our Government. That this court, which once had a de-
served reputation for sensitivity to human rights issues, should under-
take to do so is a saddening demonstration of the extent to which it
has lost the spirit which once animated our deliberations.
663 F.2d 1226, 1250 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
See also Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). In
Thornwell, Judge Richey dismissed counts I-IV of James Thornwell's complaint,
which alleged the surreptitious administration of LSD followed by interrogations
under conditions of severe distress. Judge Richey, however, found it necessary to
add a footnote:
In holding that counts I-IV must be dismissed, the Court acknowledges
the precedent of Feres, but does not offer any approval for the scope of
that decision. Indeed, to this Court, Feres appears to grant an immu-
nity which is broader than necessary and, as a result, the application of
that immunity may at times lead to unconscionable results.
Id. at 348 n.1.
99. 340 U.S. 135, 138.
Law and Inequality
the bill, their objections do not outweigh the benefits of H.R.
1054's enactment.
A. Allowance of Malpractice Claims: H.R. 1054
During nearly four decades of judicial expansion of the Feres
doctrine, Congress acquiesced through inaction. 0 0 But now, par-
tial legislative relief appears on the horizon. H.R. 1054101 would
allow military or full-time National Guard members to sue the
federal government for personal injuries or death arising out of
medical or dental care furnished by a member of the Armed
100. Jacoby, supra note 45, at 1283.
101. 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). H.R. 1054 in full reads as follows:
AN ACT
To amend chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, to allow claims
against the United States under that chapter for damages arising from
certain negligent medical care provided members of the Armed
Forces.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CLAIMS FOR IMPROPER MEDICAL CARE.
(a) COGNIZABLE CLAIMS.-Chapter 171 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
§ 2681. Certain claims arising out of medical care provided members
of the Armed Forces
(a) CLAIMS AUTHORIZED.-Subject to the provisions of this
chapter, claims may be brought under this chapter for damages against
the United States for personal injury or death of a member of the
Armed Forces serving on active duty or on full-time National Guard
duty (as defined in section 101(42) of title 10), under the conditions
prescribed in this section.
(b) LIMITATION TO MEDICAL CARE IN FIXED FACILI-
TIES.-The personal injury or death referred to in subsection (a) must
have arisen out of medical or dental care furnished the member of the
Armed Forces in a fixed medical facility operated by the Secretary of a
military department or any other fixed medical facility operated by
the United States.
(c) REDUCTION OF AWARDS OR JUDGMENTS BY OTHER
GOVERNMENT BENEFITS.-The amount of an award or judgment
on a claim under this section for personal injury or death of a member
of the Armed Forces shall be reduced by the agency making the
award, or the court entering the judgment, as the case may be, by an
amount equal to the total amount of other monetary benefits received
or to be received by the member and the member's estate, survivors,
and beneficiaries, under title 10, title 37, or title 38 that are attributa-
ble to the personal injury or death from which the claim arose. If the
amount of future benefits cannot be determined because the benefits
are provided under an annuity or other program of periodic payments,
the amount of the reduction with respect to such future benefits shall
be the actuarial present value of such future benefits.
(d) LIMITATION ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES-Any lia-
bility on a claim brought under this section shall be limited to not
more than $300,000 for losses other than economic losses.
(e) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "fixed medical facility" means a medical center,
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hospital, or clinic that is located in a building, structure, or other im-
provement to real property; and
(2) the term 'personal injury' does not include mental or emo-
tional disability unless it is the direct result of a physical injury.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for chap-
ter 171 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new item:
2681. Certain claims arising out of medical care provided members of
the Armed Forces.
SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Section 2681 of title 28, United States Code, as added by section 1,
shall apply only with respect to personal injuries or deaths occurring
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
The history of the bill, introduced in January 1987 by Representative Barney
Frank, is as follows:
During the 98th Congress, the Subcommittee on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations held hearings on a similar bill, H.R. 1942.
During the 99th Congress, the Subcommittee held hearings on H.R.
1161, Military Medical Malpractice, on July 8, and 9, 1985. The Sub-
committee amended H.R. 1161 to include a section on "Reduction of
Claims by Other Benefits" and to define "fixed medical facility", and
favorably recommended a clean bill containing these modifications to
the full Committee. This clean bill, H.R. 3175, passed the House by
317 to 90, with a floor amendment defining "personal injury". H.R.
1054 as introduced in the 100th Congress is identical to this House-
passed bill.
H.R. Rep. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5-6 (1987).
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1054 by a vote of 312-61 on February
17, 1988. 134 Cong. Rec. S929-02 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1988). It was received in the
Senate the next day. WESTLAW, Billcast library, Status file. At the time this arti-
cle went to press, H.R. 1054 was pending before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Administrative Practices.
Another bill, S. 347, would also allow militarypersons to sue the United States
for certain injuries caused by improper medical care. S. 347 provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) chapter 171
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new section: S 2681. Certain claims by members
of the Armed Forces of the United States
(a) Claims may be brought under this chapter for damages
against the United States for the personal injury or death of a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States arising out of the noncomba-
tant activities of the Armed Forces while such member is serving on
active duty if the claim arises out of the negligence of any physician,
dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or paramedical or other supporting person-
nel (including medical and dental technicians, nursing assistants, and
therapists) of the Armed Forces acting within the scope of their office
or employment in a hospital or other medical facility of the Armed
Forces.
(b) Actions brought pursuant to this section shall be brought in
the appropriate court of the United States.
(c) The remedy against the United States provided by this sec-
tion shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason
of the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."
(d) The table of sections for chapter 171 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Law and Inequality
Forces if the care was provided in a "fixed medical facility."102
This is defined as a "medical center, hospital, or clinic that is lo-
cated in a building, structure, or other improvement to real prop-
erty."103 Mental or emotional disability is not compensable unless
it is the direct result of a physical injury. Any other benefits re-
ceived by the injured member or his/her estate attributable to the
injury or death from which the claim arose reduce the recovery
provided by the bill.104 H.R. 1054, as currently proposed, thus al-
lows tort recovery for servicepersons injured by medical malprac-
tice, yet establishes limits that should assuage historical judicial
concerns.
B. Justice Department Objections
The Justice Department asserts that passage of the bill would
overrule the long-standing and viable Feres doctrine preventing
military hospital medical malpractice claims.105 The Department
finds the reasons supporting the Feres doctrine controlling: the
existence of veterans benefits, the effect of lawsuits upon military
discipline,106 and the distinctly federal relationship between the
government and military members making the application of state
2681. Certain claims by members of the Armed Forces of the United
States.
Sec. 2. Section 2681 of title 28, United States Code, as added by
the first section of this Act, shall apply only with respect to claims
arising on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
There are some differences between H.R. 1054 and S. 347. The latter provides
that redress under the bill bars a civil action against the individual military
tortfeasor. This is unnecessary, however, as the Gonzales Bill precludes suits
against individual military medical personnel. 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (Supp. 4 1976); 32
U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. 4 1976). For further discussion of the Gonzales Bill, see supra
note 139.
S. 347 fails to mention the interaction with veterans benefits. Given current
judicial treatment of these claims, the courts may interpret this new remedy as ex-
clusive. S. 347 explains which tortfeasors are covered by the bill, which may need-
lessly involve courts in battles over whether a given tortfeasor is properly defined
as "supporting personnel." Id.
H.R. 1054, unlike S. 347, specifically excludes mental illness which is not the
direct result of a physical injury. H.R. 1054 also limits recovery to injuries occurring
in a "fixed medical facility."
H.R. 1054 is discussed in this article as it is the bill being most seriously consid-
ered by Congress.
102. H.R. 1054, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (1987).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hearings, supra note 97, at 1 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
106. The military discipline rationale was first enunciated in Brown, not Feres.
See supra notes 76 through 82 and accompanying text. It is, however, one of three
grounds used to support the Feres doctrine.
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law unfair.107
The Justice Department advocates a significant additionlO8 to
the military discipline rationale of Feres: the impropriety of judi-
cial intervention in military affairs.109 This hands-off approach is
said to "derive from society's most elemental instinct: self preser-
vation through a strong military."" 0 Apparently the preservation
of individual soldiers is less compelling. What the Justice Depart-
ment really seeks to preserve is an unaccountable military govern-
ment of men, not laws.' 1 '
The Department, concerned that passage of H.R. 1054 would
blur Feres' "clear line" of government liability, warns Congress
that enactment of H.R. 1054 may invite judicial assault on Feres
which would complicate its application." 2 This "clear line" is evi-
dently more lucid to the Justice Department than to courts and
military plaintiffs. The large number of suits brought by military
plaintiffs despite the existence of Feres113 suggests that the line is
anything but clear. The Feres doctrine as currently enforced is
less clear than H.R. 1054. Furthermore, after nearly four decades
in which the Feres doctrine has not only survived but prospered by
judicial expansion, these fears are unfounded.
The Department contends that "from the perspective of all
servicemen who suffer adverse consequences from medical care,
the existing system of compensation is in many ways superior to
107. Hearings, supra note 97, at 2 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
108. While judicial non-interference is often a concern in suits involving the mil-
itary and foreign affairs, it has never been articulated as supporting the Feres doc-
trine. For a more complete discussion of cases in which judicial meddling was a
concern, see Donaldson, supra note 12, at 185-87.
109. From Orloff v. Willoughby the Justice Department quotes: "Orderly gov-
ernment requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legiti-
mate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters. Hearings, supra note 97, at 8 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice) (quoting 345 U.S. 83, 93-94
(1953)).
Yet an unaccountable military was one reason why the American Colonists as-
serted their independence from Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence
lists this as one of the King's offenses: "He has affected to render the Military in-
dependent of and superior to the Civil power." The Declaration of Independence
para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
110. Hearings, supra note 97, at 9 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
111. People understood long ago that good governance required laws: "where
there is no law, there is no transgression." Romans 4:15 (New Testament), quoted
in David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost, The Quotable Lawyer 165 (1986).
112. Hearings, supra note 97, at 10-11 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
113. See, e.g., Note, supra note 45, at 1119.
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what they would receive if they were private citizens."" 4 This
"concern" for the problems of proving negligence is baseless, be-
cause remedy under H.R. 1054 is not exclusive. The bill preserves
veterans benefits for soldiers unable to prove negligence. By re-
quiring other compensation to be subtracted from an FTCA award,
the government is protected from a double payment.
Finally, according to the Justice Department, passage of H.R.
1054 would violate "sound fiscal policy."" 5 The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the passage of H.R. 1054 would cost
the United States $25 million per year."i 6 In an age when the an-
nual budget is $1.24 trillion,11 7 and the annual outlay for national
defense is $297.6 billion,"i8 $25 million seems a small price to pay
to ensure equality for military personnel. Moreover, a tight
budget is hardly a compelling reasons to continue Feres' reign of
injustice."i 9
C. Defense Department Objections
The Defense Department asserts that allowing military per-
sonnel to sue for medical malpractice but not for other forms of
negligence would create a class of privileged claimants. 2 0 Doing
so, they reason, demeans other injuries suffered by military per-
114. Hearings, supra note 97, at 13 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice). The Justice Department
notes:
While it sometimes is argued that the Feres doctrine is unfair to ser-
vicemen who are the victims of medical malpractice, the Feres doc-
trine in fact is but one element of a compensation package available to
servicemen which, on the whole, is far more generous, even-handed,
and fair than compensation available to private citizens.
Id. at 12.
115. Hearings, supra note 97, at 21 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
116. H.R. Rep. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1987).
117. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government
5-27 (1988). This figure shows the estimated outlay for 1988.
118. Id. at 5-12. This figure shows the estimated outlay for 1988.
119. In Bounds v. Smith, the Court stated that there was a "fundamental consti-
tutional right of access to the courts." 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). This access must be
"adequate, effective, and meaningful." Id. at 822. The Court then held that despite
the expense, states "must protect the rights of prisoners to access to the courts by
providing them with law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge." Id. at
817. Taxpayers thus bear the cost of prisoners' right to access the courts. Soldiers,
who incur their injuries while serving their country should not be denied their
right to access the courts because of financial considerations.
120. Hearings on H.R. 1054 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm of the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1987) [hereinafter Defense Hearings] (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
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sonnel since they would be denied a tort remedy.121 After denying
active duty soldiers tort recovery for service-connected injuries for
decades, while allowing FTCA recovery to veterans, soldiers with
injuries not service-connected,122 and federal prisoners, the sudden
concern over "privileged" injuries is surprising.
The Department claims that consistency of treatment with
respect to veterans benefits boosts morale. While it is true that
there is a certain uniformity in denying redress for race discrimi-
nation123 and also denying redress for one rendered a social and
emotional vegetable after being a guinea pig for LSD experimenta-
tion,124 uniformity of inequality will not boost morale. Further-
more, the holding of Muniz-that a non-uniform right to recover
for prisoners was no excuse for denying recovery altogether'- -
applies equally well to military personnel.
The Defense Department contends that H.R. 1054 would not
improve medical care in the Armed Forces for four reasons.126
First, the Feres doctrine bars judicial recovery for only thirty per-
cent of the patient population served by military medical facilities;
"[a]ny argument that military physicians provide better care to
those who may sue for malpractice is a gratuitous insult to this
dedicated group of officers who are bound by the same ethical re-
quirements in treating all of their patients." 2 7 Second, if the inci-
dence of medical malpractice is represented by the number of
malpractice actions, then the threat of litigation does not improve
medical care. Third, H.R. 1054's deterrence theory-that malprac-
tice liability will deter negligent conduct-is misplaced because
military physicians are immune from suit and the purpose of tort
law is not to punish but to compensate. Finally, military health
care can best be improved through quality assurance, not
121. Id.
122. It is ironic that military personnel are given broader relief for injuries when
on leave than when defending our country.
123. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
124. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, (D.D.C. 1979). For further dis-
cussion of the facts of this case, see supra note 98 and infra note 147.
125. 374 U.S. 150 (1963). The Court stated it this way: "[t]hough the Govern-
ment expresses some concern that the non-uniform right to recover will prejudice
prisoners, it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would prejudice them even
more. Id. at 162.
126. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 5-7 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Cousnel, Department of Defense).
127. Id. at 5. Historically, however, the United States has not relied on ethics at
the expense of law. In 1779, John Adams, in the original draft of the Massachusetts
Constitution, termed this principle "a government of laws, and not of men." John
Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 463 (1968).
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litigation.128
In its first argument against the bill, the Defense Department
notes that because seventy percent of the population served by
military hospitals already have the right to sue,1 2 9 extending this
right to the remaining thirty percent comprised of active duty ser-
vicepersons will have no impact on the quality of military health
care. While it may be correct that improved medical care does not
precisely correlate with the extension of liability, it seems that in-
creased liability would have some effect. Indeed, one of the funda-
mental principles behind tort liability is deterrence.130
The Department's point does, however, highlight the superfi-
ciality of the "military discipline" predicate of Feres. Seventy per-
cent of the military population are allowed to question the actions
of military personnel. Yet the military has not been rendered inef-
fective. Active-duty servicepersons may sue on behalf of depen-
dents, including claims for incidental or consequential damages,
medical expenses and loss of consortium.131 Thus, active-duty mil-
itary members are allowed to "assert" claims that question the
propriety of decisions or conduct by fellow members of the mili-
tary"13 2 -- the exact horror ostensibly avoided by the application of
Feres. Indeed, over time a judicial pattern in support of Feres has
emerged: rationale after rationale is discarded and then revitalized
as the courts struggle in vain to find convincing support for the un-
just effect of Feres.
In support of its second reason why H.R. 1054 would not im-
prove military medical care, the Defense Department, noting the
rising incidence of malpractice claims in the civil sector, asserts
that "if the number of malpractice actions reflects the incidence of
malpractice, then the threat of suit does nothing to improve medi-
cal care."133 The premise of this statement, however, is questiona-
ble. It seems just as likely that the growing number of lawsuits is
a reflection of increased consumer knowledge and aggressive mar-
128. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 7 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
129. The Feres doctrine does not bar military retirees and dependents of active
duty and retired personnel from suing under the FTCA, unless the injury is tracea-
ble to a service-connected injury. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 5 (state-
ment of H. Lawrence Garrett, III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
130. George Christie, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts 5 (1983) (Deter-
rence of wrongdoers is one of the four goals of tort law); William Prosser, Prosser
on Torts 27 (1941) ("The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has been
quite important in the field of torts.").
131. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 35.
132. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 599 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
133. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 5 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
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keting of attorneys, rather than the increasing incidence of mal-
practice.'3 4 Moreover, the Department's collection of malpractice
statistics for military and civilian hospitals gives no insight into the
corresponding number of successful claims, though this would bet-
ter gauge the actual incidence of malpractice.
The Department claims that there are fewer allegations of
malpractice against military practitioners than against their civil-
ian counterparts. 135 If everything else were equal, these figures
would be relevant. However, everything else is not equal: in no
private situation does the "owner" of the hospital wield such
power over all aspects of the potential claimant's life. While a ci-
vilian can sue a doctor or hospital and simply go elsewhere for fu-
ture medical care, the ultimate health care provider for the
military population-the government--controls employment,
housing, leave and other decisions affecting military members.13 6
Additionally, servicepersons have little incentive to waste time and
money litigating claims when the Feres doctrine will bar recovery
in the end. Thus, it seems likely that the incidence of military
medical malpractice is understated.
Third, the Defense Department disputes the goal of some of
H.R. 1054's supporters: that the threat of litigation will improve
medical care. 13 7 It argues that this deterrence theory is misplaced
because the purpose of tort law and the FTCA is compensatory,
not punitive' 3 8 and individual military physicians are immune
from suit.139
134. At the very least, the cause of the rising number of medical malpractice
claims is unclear. Most doctors and professional organizations believe that exces-
sive recovery in meritorious cases gives substantial incentive to pursue marginal or
frivolous cases. U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice 27 (Feb.
1986). Conversely, most legal organizations believe the fundamental cause of medi-
cal malpractice claims is medical carelessness or negligence. Id.
135. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 5-6 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
136. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-950
(West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
137. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 6-7 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
138. Id. at 6.
139. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (Supp. 1976)). The courts have read Feres to bar
suit against individual military tortfeasors as well as the government. See, e.g., Jaf-
fee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3d Cir. 1981) ("We have also interpreted
the doctrine to immunize governmenta officials sued in their individual capacity
from liability to military personnel for negligent torts."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 40.
In Henderson v. Bluenink, however, the District of Columbia Circuit held that
military doctors were no longer protected by Barr v. Mateo's rule of immunity for
government officials. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Congress reacted in 1976 by passing the
Gonzales bill, which made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for military malpractice
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Neither of these reasons detracts from the deterrence theory.
Although one goal of the FTCA is compensation for injured plain-
tiffs, few things work in isolation. If FTCA compensation inciden-
tally serves to improve medical care, this is achieved with neither
party suffering adverse consequences. The military plaintiff is
simply not injured, thus avoiding a need for government
remuneration.
Even if deterrence were a legitimate goal, reasons the De-
fense Department, H.R. 1054 would be ineffective because individ-
ual military physicians are immune from suit.140 Yet deterrence is
not accomplished solely by personal liability. Military hospitals,
faced with financial liability, could use military discipline to take
personnel actions assuring better medical care. Private hospitals,
for instance, institute extensive review programs and other checks
on doctors to avoid liability under a "control" theory.141 Likewise,
military hospitals faced with liability can implement review pro-
grams to avoid liability. Adverse personnel action would thus
serve as a deterrent to individual military doctors. Therefore, H.R.
1054 may effectively deter malpractice despite the immunity of in-
dividual doctors.
The Defense Department finally argues that quality assur-
ance, not litigation, is the best way of improving health care.142
An emphasis on quality control is commendable. In fact, vigorous
quality assurance will address one of the problems foreseen by
both Departments-a mass of devastating litigation. But the real
problem, not addressed by either Department, is the underlying
inequality in singling out servicepersons in denying judicial redress
for injuries. Thus, while it is likely that H.R. 1054 would improve
medical care it would, more importantly, restore the forgotten
rights of active-duty servicepersons.
Both Departments strenuously argue that H.R. 1054 would
have the ironic effect of massively increasing the government's ex-
posure to medical malpractice claims at a time when the existing
claims. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (Supp. 4 1976); 32 U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. 4 1976). For mili-
tary members this remedy was illusive due to the judicially created Feres exception
to the FTCA. For a detailed discussion of the Gonzales bill, its interaction with the
FTCA, and possible constitutional violations, see Graham, supra note 21.
140. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 6 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
141. See, e.g., Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.2d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal.Rptr. 418
(1977).
142. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 7 (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
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tort system is in a state of crisis.143 Regardless of whether the tort
system and medical malpractice claims are "out of control,"'144 the
burden of reducing the number of lawsuits and the instances of re-
covery should not be borne exclusively by injured military
personnel.
Opponents of H.R. 1054 raise many of the tired arguments
that have been discarded by courts and commentators over the
years. While the Justice and Defense Departments contemplate
some new horrors,145 none outweigh the benefits of the bill's
enactment.
III. Proposal
Although H.R. 1054 is a good first step towards equality of
treatment, our nation's servicepersons deserve a more comprehen-
sive remedy than that offered by H.R. 1054. Congress should adopt
a bill that would allow court access to all military plaintiffs. Even
if H.R. 1054 was enacted, Rudolph Feres would still be denied re-
covery because he happened to die by fire rather than the slip of a
surgeon's knife. James Thornwell'48 would also be denied recov-
ery. Instead of being injured by a negligent medical diagnosis,
Thornwell was permanently injured when he was the subject of an
experiment on the truth-inducing effects of LSD.147 These illus-
143. See id. at 5; Hearings, supra note 97, at 17-18 (statement of Richard K. Wil-
lard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
Willard devotes four pages to statistics and examples showing the problems of
the current tort system and the excessiveness of medical malpractice awards. High-
lights include:
[T]he annual cost of liability insurance for certain medical specialties
now exceeds $97,000--effectively foreclosing those specialties to many
younger physicians who have not yet developed a large enough prac-
tice to afford such premiums .... [T]hree times as many malpractice
claims are filed today as were filed a decade ago, and claimants are re-
ceiving record awards....
Willard then concludes that [tJhere thus is something profoundly disturbing about
the existing state tort law system for resolving medical malpractice claims. Id. at
18-21 (footnote omitted).
144. Hearings, supra note 97, at 20 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
145. See, e.g., Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 17 (statement of H. Lawrence
Garrett, III, General Counsel, Department of Defense) ("The pendency of suit
would also provide a colorable basis for personnel who do not want to accept new
assignments to seek delay of any change in their status either from their military
superior or the federal judge before whom their case is pending.").
146. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
147. See id.:
The official report prepared by the Operation Third Chance special
purpose team explained that the experiment on Mr. Thornwell
demonstrated the 'usefulness of employing as a duress factor the de-
vice of inviting the subjects' attention to his [LSD]-influenced state
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trations demonstrate the shortcomings of a bill which only allows
redress for medical and dental malpractice.
In the words of former Chief Justice Earl Warren, "our citi-
zens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because
they have doffed their civilian clothes."'148 Military personnel
should be allowed to sue under the FTCA for injuries incurred in-
cident to service without H.R. 1054's restrictions. An important
fact underlies all claims against the government by servicepersons
on active duty. Each claimant sustained an injury due to the negli-
gent action or inaction of others in the Armed Forces.14 9 This fact
supports a less restrictive bill. The negligent manner in which an
action was performed, not the means of injury, should control.150
Limiting judicial redress stops short of recognizing that serviceper-
sons have rights which deserve protection. All injury and death,
not only that caused by medical and dental malpractice, should
have judicial redress.
Additionally, H.R. 1054, by redressing only a narrow band of
claims, condones the current judicial treatment of all other types
of service-connected injuries. In Feres the Supreme Court invited
congressional action if Congress did not intend the results
achieved under the Feres doctrine.'15 H.R. 1054 implicitly stamps
congressional approval on the application of Feres to all service-
connected injuries not caused by medical or dental malpractice.
Given judicial zealousness in applying the Feres doctrine, any con-
gressional approval would further entrench this doctrine of
inequality.
The very label that triggers government non-liability, "inci-
dent to service," suggests the solution. The purpose of the Armed
Forces is to benefit and protect society as a whole.15 2 On that the-
and threatening to extend this state indefinitely, even to a permanent
condition of insanity or to bring it to an end at the discretion of the
interrogators....' The report also concluded that in Mr. Thornwell's
case, the drug produced an 'extreme paranoic reaction' which was
'highly sustained and almost incapacitating.'
Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
148. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 188
(1962).
149. Defense Hearings, supra note 120, at 3, (statement of H. Lawrence Garrett,
III, General Counsel, Department of Defense.
150. While arriving at a different solution, the Defense Department recognizes
this disparity as well: "H.R. 1054 provides a remedy only for malpractice, but not
for other forms of negligence. If a soldier loses a leg on field maneuvers, on the
base in a driving accident, or in the hospital at the hands of a surgeon, he or she has
the same injury." Id. at 4.
151. 340 U.S. at 138.
152. See U.S. Const. preamble; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("provide for the com-
mon Defense") (emphasis added).
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ory, expenses of tanks and bombers are rightfully shared by all
United States citizens. Products liability law operates on the
premise that consumer injuries are part of the cost of doing busi-
ness.15 3 Similarly, service-connected injuries should be viewed as
part of the nation's cost of defense. It is difficult to see why the
injuries of those working for the whole should be borne exclu-
sively by the individual.
Although special problems exist due to the status of military
plaintiffs, the FTCA contains three exceptions that would deny
government liability in those situations where military discipline is
a valid concern. First, no claims arising in a foreign country are
allowed.154 Thus, even without Feres, military members could not
recover for injuries caused by a military exercise in France or any
other foreign country.
Second, claims arising out of combatant activities are not
compensable under the FTCA.155 This exception alone obviates
most of the military discipline concerns. The allowance of suit is
most problematic on the battlefield.156 During peacetime the mili-
tary operates like any other bureaucracy.157 For example, the gov-
ernment is liable under the FTCA if an FBI agent is injured by
government negligence. Yet employee discipline and efficiency are
not markedly impaired. In battle, where the analogy to other bu-
reaucracies ends, the FTCA would immunize the government from
suit.
Third, no coverage exists where an injury arises out of the
exercise of discretion by the government or its employees. 158 Dis-
153. See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672
(Iowa 1970), where the court stated, "[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves." Id. at 683.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
155. Id. at § 2680(j).
156. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983).
157. See Howland, supra note 39, at 107 ("The military transformed into a huge
civilian-like bureaucracy.").
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). This "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA reads:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
Id. For thorough coverage of the discretionary function exception, and an argu-
ment that this exception alone renders the Feres doctrine unnecessary, see Note,
supra note 45.
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cretionary functions include certain planning, policy, regulatory
and disciplinary decisions, thereby protecting unique military in-
terests.15 9 Only operational functions would expose the govern-
ment to liability under the FTCA.160 These exceptions allow
military discipline to preside over the rights of servicepersons only
when it is truly necessary.
The following bill would accomplish these results.
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter
171 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
S 2681. Claims by.members of the Armed Forces
(a) CLAIMS OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES.-Sub-
ject to all the provisions of this chapter, claims may be brought
under this chapter for damages against the United States for per-
sonal injury or death of a member of the Armed Services serving
on active duty or on full-time National Guard duty (as defined in
section 101 (42) of title 10).
(b) REDUCTION OF AWARDS BY OTHER GOVERN-
MENT BENEFITS.-The amount of an award or judgment on a
claim under this section for personal injury or death of a member
of the Armed Forces or National Guard shall be reduced by the
agency making the award, or the court entering the judgment, by
an amount equal to the total amount of other monetary benefits
received or to be received by the member or the member's estate,
survivors, and beneficiaries, under title 10, title 37, or title 38 that
are attributable to the personal injury or death from which the
claim arose. If the amount of future benefits cannot be deter-
mined because the benefits are provided under an annuity or other
program of periodic payments, the amount of the reduction with
respect to such future benefits shall be the actuarial present value
of such benefits.
(c) DATE OF APPLICABILITY.-Section 2681 of Title 28,
United States Code, as added by this Act, shall apply only with re-
spect to claims arising on or after the date of enactment of this
Act.
159. Note, supra note 45, at 1121.
160. Id. at 1122.
[Vol. 6:153
19881 FORGOTTEN RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 183
Conclusion
For too long American soldiers have suffered from the con-
torted Feres doctrine, and have been effectively denied access to
the courts. The Feres doctrine exacts too high a price from the na-
tion's military members. The proposed bill would allow claims for
the service-connected injuries or death of active duty military per-
sonnel subject to the FTCA's existing exceptions. Three excep-
tions in particular-that for claims arising in a foreign country,
claims arising out of combatant activity and claims arising out of a
discretionary function-would obviate any problems due to the
military plaintiff's status. This solution remedies the injustice in
denying military personnel access to the courts while at the same
time protecting legitimate government interests.

